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A Treaty on Enforcing Human Rights Against
Business: Closing the Loophole or Getting
Stuck in a Loop?
PIERRE THIELBORGER* & TOBIAS ACKERMANN*
ABSTRACT
This Article takes a human rights law perspective on the issue of
enforcing corporate social responsibility. While corporations receive a
variety of rights under international law, they do not equally hold a
corresponding set of duties. The Article assesses the merits and
shortcomings of existing initiatives to bridge this gap, in particularthe
Special Representative to the Secretary-General's (legally nonbinding)
Framework and Guiding Principles, as well as the most recent initiative
at the United Nations Human Rights Council on developing a (legally
binding) treaty on business and human rights. While emphasizing that
existing legal frameworks-such as human rights law, international
criminal law, and international investment law-do not suffice to close
this loophole (of corporationsbeing rights bearing but not rights bound),
the Article remains equally skeptical about the prospects for a new
legally binding treaty. Even if such a treaty were realized, it remains
largely unclear how and by which bodies such a treaty would be enforced
toward corporations. The authors suggest concentrating efforts on
improving the enforceability of existing standards under the Framework
and Guiding Principles rather than striving for a new treaty, and to do
so on the international,but even more on the national, level.

* Pierre Thielborger is Professor for German Public Law and International Law at
the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV) and at the Law
Faculty, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. We thank Anna Beckers and Mark
Kawakami for their helpful comments and insightful suggestions.
** Tobias Ackermann is a doctoral student at Ruhr University Bochum and research
associate at the IFHV.

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 24 #1 (Winter 2017)
@ Indiana University Maurer School of Law

43

44

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:1
INTRODUCTION

Corporations' have the potential to negatively affect the human
rights of their workers, of the population affected by their operations,
and of individuals beyond their direct corporate activities. 2 However,
while the protection of businesses through specialized investment or
free trade treaties has grown significantly over the years, international
law has, as of yet, not imposed direct human rights obligations on
corporations. This imbalance is increasingly perceived as unsatisfactory.
Pressure by the public, consumers, and stakeholders has resulted in a
myriad of self-regulations and voluntary codes following the "corporate
social responsibility" (CSR) terminology. 3 Because the CSR codes are
voluntary, legally enforcing such responsibilities remains a difficult
issue. While other authors provide valuable contributions on how
private law can contribute to enforce this responsibility better, 4 this
Article focuses on the role that international law can play in these
efforts. In particular, we argue that, also from the perspective of
international law, the enforcement of CSR codes should be welcomed.
Approaches to enforce CSR codes can be seen as part of the strict
implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human

1. We use the terms "corporations" and "businesses" interchangeably, without
limiting them to transnational corporations (TNCs).
2. See, e.g., John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises),
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Addendum: Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey of the
Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuse, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (May 23, 2008).
3. Ilias Bantekas, CorporateSocial Responsibility in InternationalLaw, 22 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 309, 311 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Anna Beckers & Mark Kawakami, Domestic Enforcement of Private
Regulation Is (Not) the Answer: Making and Questioning the Case of Corporate Social
Responsibility Codes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2017); Jan M. Smits, Enforcing
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes under PrivateLaw, or: on the DiscipliningPower of
Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAI LEGAL STUD. 99 (2017); Gunther Teubner, Corporate
Codes in the Varieties of Capitalism: How Their Enforcement Depends Upon the.
Difference Between Production Regimes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81 (2017). For
different suggestions as to the enforceability of CSR Codes, see ANNA BECKERS,
ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION

AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2015) (arguing that private law can, and should, enforce
corporate self-regulation as genuine legal obligations); ANDREAS ROHMKORF, CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAw AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS (2015) (examining the

contributions made by private law to the promotion of corporate social responsibility);
LOUISE VYTOPIL, CONTRACTUAL CONTROL IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, CODES OF CONDUCT, CONTRACTS AND (AVOIDING) LIABILITY (2015)

(discussing to what extent multinational corporations can be held liable for corporate
social responsibility violations).
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Rights (GPs)5 that is to be preferred over developing an international
treaty, which meets obstacles as to a meaningful conclusion as well as to
its enforcement.
In a globalized economy, in which companies operate everywhere in
the world, international standards are particularly promising and are
6
needed to restrain corporate conduct effectively and consistently. Still,
the
close
to
mechanism
binding
any
states cannot as of yet agree upon
abuses.
corporate
against
rights
human
loophole in the protection of
Instead, the most comprehensive instrument on the United Nations
level is nonbinding. The Framework for Business and Human Rights
(Framework)7 and the GPs, developed by John Ruggie as Special
Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) and his team, clarify
state human rights obligations with regard to threats posed by
businesses, but only identify a social responsibility of corporations to
respect human rights.
This Article proceeds in three main parts. In Part I, we introduce
the SRSG's work and evaluate its (partly rather harsh) criticism.
Despite its success in obtaining the first consensus on a U.N. business
and human rights initiative, many criticize the SRSG for a lack of legal
clarity and binding nature. The criticism, combined with the slow
8
implementation of the GPs, has lately given fresh impetus to calls for a
legally binding instrument. Part II addresses these calls. While many
debate whether and how existing legal frameworks such as
international human rights, criminal, or investment law may be
adaptable to address corporate human rights abuses, a recent initiative
within the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) aims at
ultimately creating a new treaty on the issue. While it is undeniable
that protection gaps exist in the current legal regime for the protection
of human rights from corporate abuses, the question remains whether a
treaty would bring significant improvement.

&

5. U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principleson Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations "Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework (2011)
[hereinafter UNHRC, GP-Report].
6. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Corporate
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 448 (2001); Beth Stephens,
Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT'L
COMP. L. REv. 401, 401 (2001).
7. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), U.N.
Hum. Rts. Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter UNHRC, Framework-Report].
8. See Rep. of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 1 91, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/25 (May 5, 2014)
[hereinafter UNHRC, Working Grp.-Report].
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This Article answers the question whether a new treaty would close
the mentioned loophole or whether current efforts are rather a
temporary success, running the danger of failure in the face of
unrealistic expectations. As will be elaborated in the concluding section,
it is not yet time for a treaty on business and human rights. Instead of
getting wrapped up in mutual blaming exercises, all stakeholders must
make a universal effort to the further improvement and implementation
of the business and human rights agenda. In this respect, the domestic
enforcement of CSR codes, which companies are expected to develop and
adopt as part of their social responsibility to respect, can be an
important contribution to meet this objective.
I. THE U.N. FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The SRSG's work, the UN Framework and Guiding Principles,
constitutes the first comprehensive U.N. initiative on the issue of
business and human rights. Unlike prior approaches, it has gained
significant support by various actors, including capital-exporting states
and the business sector. The state obligation to protect, the businesses'
own responsibility to respect, and the need for effective remedies for
victims of corporate human rights abuses form the framework of
"Protect, Respect, and Remedy." While building upon a wide consensus,
the Framework and GPs have also undergone heavy criticism regarding
shortcomings concerning their nonbinding nature and overall
effectiveness in securing the protection against corporate human rights
abuses.
A. "Protect,Respect, and Remedy"-The UN Framework and Guiding
Principles
John Ruggie's mandate as SRSG was not the first UN initiative on
the issue of business and human rights. After the never adopted and
ultimately abandoned draft code of conduct on transnational
corporations (TNCs) in 1990,9 a Working Group on the Working
9. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Development and InternationalEconomic Cooperation:
TransnationalCorporations,U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (June 12, 1990), extracts in
INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 6-14 (Stephen Tully ed.,
2005). The Code included a provision according to which 'TNCs shall respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms." Id. art. 14. For the Code's drafting history and reasons
for its failure, see id., at 5-6; see also JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 12 (2006); Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilitiesof Transnational
Corporationsin the Protection of InternationalHuman Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
153, 167 (1997).
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Methods and Activities of TNCs10 developed a set of draft "Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" (Norms) in 2003.11 The
Norms, although for themselves of course nonbinding, were formulated
in a treaty-like manner, imposing on businesses, inter alia, the
obligations to promote, respect, protect, and contribute to the realization
12
of human rights within their "spheres of activity and influence." This
wide range of obligations was in many ways equal to states' own
13
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. While some
14
most
praised the Norms as a big step toward binding "hard" law,
corporations and states rejected them and the equation of businesses
15
Although the UN Subwith states for going excessively far.
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
endorsed the Norms in 2003,16 a consensus was beyond reach.
Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights quite bluntly stated in

10. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rts., Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion
& Prot. of Hum. Rts. Res. 1998/8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1998/8 (Aug. 20, 1998)
(establishing the Working Group).
11. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rts., Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion
& Prot. of Hum. Rts., Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporationsand Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev. 2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter ECOSOC, Norms]. On the
Norms' drafting history, see David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 901, 903-07 (2003).
12. ECOSOC, Norms, supra note 11, at 111 1, 12. On the Norms' specifics, see Carolin
F. Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 4 German L.J. 1065, 1072-78
(2003).
13. SEE

OLIVIER

DE

SCHUTTER,

INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS

LAW: CASES,

&

MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 280 (2014).
14. See Hillemanns, supra note 12, at 1079-80; Tracy M. Schmidt, Transnational
Corporate Responsibility for InternationalEnvironmental and Human Rights Violations:
Will the United Nations' 'Worms" Provide the Required Means?, 36 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 217,
240 (2005); Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 11, at 914-15. But see Philip Alston, The
"Not-a-Cat"Syndrome: Can the InternationalHuman Rights Regime Accommodate NonState Actors?, in Non-State Actors and Human Rights 3, 13-14 (PhilipAlston ed., 2005)
(criticizingthe Norms' vague language).
15. See, e.g., John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 821 (2007); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Hum.
Rts., Report of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, Jil 20-21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 2005) (listing
arguments brought forward in favor of and against the Norms).
16. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion
Prot. of Hum. Rts. Res. 2003/16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/16 (Aug. 13, 2003).
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.

2004 that the Norms had "not been requested" and had "no legal
standing."17 This effectively ended the Norms' story.
Instead, nonbinding CSR-initiatives gained increasing popularity.
Accordingly, when the SRSG started his work, he had before him an
uncountable number of such initiatives by various actors. 18 The
"Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework, proposed by the SRSG in
2008, aimed at offering an "authoritative focal point" in this vastly
fragmented field. 19 The GPs, presented three years later, serve to
operationalize that Framework. 20 The UNHRC unanimously endorsed
both and installed a working group as a follow-up mechanism after the
SRSG's prolonged mandate had expired. 21
The two instruments rest on three pillars. First, states are to protect
against human rights abuses by third parties. They are in breach of this
obligation if the human rights abuse is attributable to the state or if the
state fails to "take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and
redress private actors' abuse." 22 GP 2 identifies one of those steps as
clearly setting out "the expectation that all business enterprises . .
respect human rights."
This expectation forms the basis for the second pillar. Businesses
"should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved."
Corporations should develop policy commitments, exercise "human
rights due diligence," 23 and provide for or cooperate in remediation
processes. 24 The language of this pillar already implies that this
17. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Dec. 2004/116, 11 (c), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116 (Apr. 22, 2004); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Dec. 2004/279,
| (c), U.N. Doc. E/DEC/2004/279 (July 22, 2004) (confirming the commission's finding).
18. For overviews of CSR initiatives, see, Bantekas, supra note 3, at 317-27;
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Annual Report on the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2008: Employment and Industrial
Relations ch. 6 (2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/mne-2008-en. See also UN
Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/.
19. UNHRC, Framework-Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 5.
20. UNHRC, GP-Report, supra note 5.
21. See UNHRC Res. 8/7, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7 (June 18, 2008); UNHRC Res. 17/4,
U.N. Doc. AIHRCIRes/17/4 (June 16, 2011). See generally Michael K. Addo, The Reality of
the United Nations Guiding Principleson Business and Human Rights, 14 Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 133 (2014) (describing the Working Group's agenda and methodology).
22. UNHRC, GP-Report, supra note 5, Annex at 11 1, commentary at p. 7.
23. Due diligence may require corporations, for example, to assess their impact on local
groundwater, see Susan Ariel Aaronson & Ian Higham, "Re-righting Business"- John
Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International Human Rights Standards for
TransnationalFirms 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 333, 358 (2013). On the human right to water, see
PIERRE THIELBORGER, THE RIGHT(S) TO WATER: THE MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF A

UNIQUE HUMAN RIGHT 56-88 (2014).
24. UNHRC, GP-Report, supra note 5, Annex at

1
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responsibility is an extralegal creature born from social expectations
and shaped by softer words and standards than its state counterpart.
Developing voluntary private CSR codes and effectively implementing
them within the corporate organization are crucial components of this
social expectation.
With the last pillar, the GPs again put an obligation on states to
ensure access of victims of corporate human rights abuses to an effective
remedy. At the same time, "business enterprises should establish or
participate in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms." Taken
together, the SRSG's work is to constitute "an inter-related and dynamic
system of preventative and remedial measures." It builds upon national
incorporation and application of human rights standards as well as
systems of
global
of "autonomous
implementation
corporate
25
institutionalized social norms."
B. The Reception of the Guiding Principles
The SRSG accomplished an unprecedented consensus among states,
26
His work, the first
corporations, and human rights advocates alike.
27
has heavily
successful, officially adopted UN initiative in the field,
28
The talk of a consensus, however, is
influenced other instruments.
29
only one part of the tale. Abrasive criticism is equally leveled. Critics

&

25. Larry CatA Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations Protect-Respect-Remedy
Project: The State, the Corporationand Human Rights in a Global Governance Context, 9
SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 37, 43 (2011).
26. See, e.g., European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on
Implementing the UN Guiding Principleson Business and Human Rights - State of Play,
SWD (2015) 144 final (July 14, 2015); Aaronson & Higham, supra note 23 (praising the
GPs as an important innovation in global governance); Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie's
GuidingPrinciples on Business and Human Rights: Chartingan Embracive Approach to
Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 TEX. INT'L L.J. 33, 52 (2012); Jan Wouters
Anna-Luise Chand, Multinational Corporations in International Law, in NON-STATE
ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 225, 241-42 (Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & Cedric

Ryngaert eds., 2015).
27. John Ruggie, Regulating Multinationals:The UN GuidingPrinciples, Civil Society,
and International Legalization, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF

THE BEGINNING (Cdsar Rodriguez-Garavito ed., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474236). The Global Compact, unlike Framework
and GPS, neither covers all TNCs nor is it a comprehensive instrument dealing
exclusively with human rights; see David Weissbrodt, Keynote Address: International
Standard-Settingon the Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses, 26 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 373, 381 (2008).
28. See, e.g., OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ch. IV (2011),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en.
29. See Blitt, supra note 26, at 52-54; Carlos L6pez, The 'Ruggie Process':From Legal
Obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF
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assert the Framework and GPs to be too soft, too pragmatic, and too
short. Although these points do have merit, the SRSG's work must
rightly be contextualized as a starting point and not be overburdened
with overly ambitious expectations in the highly controversial field of
business and human rights.
1. The "Too Soft" Critique
Approaches toward a legally binding mechanism like the UN Norms
failed mainly because of their bold ambition. 30 Labeled as only restating
existing legal principles, 31 the Norms went beyond any consensus
between states, let alone the business sector, as the prevailing opinion
remains that human rights law does not bind private businesses. 32
Likewise, the SRSG expressly distanced himself from the "train
wreck[ed]" Norms 33 as well as an overarching treaty altogether. 34 The
corporate responsibility identified in the Framework and GPs instead
mirrors a "basic expectation society has of business." 35
Critics claim that the SRSG failed to recognize the limitations of
this approach. They assert that the social expectations formulated by

BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 58, 58-59 (Surya Deva

& David Bilchitz eds., 2013); Int'l Fed'n for Hum. Rts. (FIDH), Joint Civil Society
Statement on the Draft Guiding Principleson Business and Human Rights, FIDH (Jan. 31,
2011), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdflJointCSOStatement onGPs.pdf.
30. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., SRSG, Interim Report on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporationsand Other Business Enterprises,
1 59, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) (prepared by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
ECOSOC, Interim report] (speaking of "doctrinal excesses" and "exaggerated legal
claims"); Ruggie, supra note 15, at 822-827; Wouters & Chand, supra note 26, at 239.
31. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 11, at 913.
32.

See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 656

(8th ed. 2012); MARKOS KARAVIAS, CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
83 (2013); Wouters & Chand, supra note 26, at 236. But see David Bilchitz, A Chasm
Between "Is" and "Ought"? A Critique of the Normative Foundations of the SRSG's
Framework and the Guiding Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF
BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT?, supra note 29, at 107,
110-14.
33. John Ruggie, Remarks Delivered at a Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility 2,
Bamberg, Germany (June 14, 2006), http/www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/
reports-and-materialsRuggie-remarks-to-Fair-Labor-Association-and-German-Network-of-BusinessEthics-144une-2006.pdf But see Weissbrodt, supra note 31, at 382-90 (defending the
Norms).
34. Ruggie, supra note 27 (manuscript at 13); John Ruggie, Business and Human
Rights: Treaty Road not Travelled (Ethical Corporation, May 2008), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edulmrcbg/news/ruggie/Pages%20from%2OECM%20May-FINALJohnRug
gie-may/o2010.pdf.
35. UNHRC, GP-Report, supra note 5, Annex, preamble at Jill 4, 6.
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36
the SRSG were inconsistent and without a clear normative basis and
argue that "soft law" approaches were ineffective when it comes to
protecting human rights.37 While this critique is understandable from a
human rights perspective, the SRSG's work must neither be seen as the
end of the process nor taken to mean that binding regulations are
excluded per se. Instead, opting for a "soft law" solution must be seen in
the context of the UN Norms' failure, as it became apparent that many

were opposed to the treaty idea favoring voluntary codes.
2. The "Too Pragmatic"Critique
Against the background of diverse and strongly opposing opinions
on the matter, the SRSG took an approach he labeled "principled
pragmatism"38 and included a large number of stakeholders varying
39
The
from governments and human rights advocates to corporations.
reliance on particularly appealing language, such as the notions of
"social expectation" and due diligence, is indicative of the SRSG's aim to
40
According to his critics,
secure the support of the business sector.
however, the SRSG thereby overemphasized an elusive consensus
leaving ambition and the normative understanding of human rights
41
behind.

36. Bilchitz, supranote 32, at 136-37; L6pez, supra note 29, at 65-67.
37. Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business
Activities in Conflict Zones, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 324 (2011); Jean-Marie Kamatali, The
New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights' Contribution in Ending the
Divisive Debate over Human Rights Responsibilities of Companies: Is It Time for an ICJ
Advisory Opinion?, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 437, 449-50 (2012); Weissbrodt, supra
note 27, at 390.
38. ECOSOC, Interim report, supra note 30, at ¶ 81.
39. UNHRC, GP-Report, supra note 5, at 1 8, 10.
40. See Karin Buhmann, Navigating from 'Train Wreck" to Being 'Welcomed' Negotiation
Strategies and Argumentative Patterns in the Development of the UNFramework, in HUMAN
RIGHTS

OBLIGATIONS

OF

BUSINESS: BEYOND

THE

CORPORATE

RESPONSIBILITY

TO

RESPECT?, supra note 29, at 29; Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and
Corporate Groups: Does CorporateLaw Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 113, 129 (2013).
41. See Surya Deva, Treating Human Rights Lightly: A Critique of the Consensus
Rhetoric and the Language Employed by the Guiding Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT?, supra

note 29, at 78, 103; L6pez, supra note 29, at 71; Justine Nolan, The Corporate
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Soft Law or Not Law?, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT?, supra

note 29, at 138, 161.
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3. The "Too Short" Critique
Finally, many criticize the SRSG's work as being too cautious. In the
eyes of the critics, the steps taken lacked ambition, which mirrored the
fact that too many important questions were bypassed. 42 They further
characterize the GPs-in stark contrast to the Norms-as too narrow,
as they establish only negative corporate responsibilities. 43 Drawing on
GP 12, according to which businesses should respect, at a minimum,
rights expressed in the International Bill of Human RightS 44 as well as
the International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, 45 critics hold that such a broad-brush
human rights responsibility does not do justice to the specifics of each
human right. 46 Finally, opponents argue that the GPs ultimately fail to
ensure access to effective remedies by not providing a comprehensive
implementation mechanism. 47 Instead of delivering a clear normative
framework, the SRSG shifted from substance to process, thereby
ultimately failing to provide an effective instrument to protect human
rights against corporate abuses. 48
4. A Realistic Account of the SRSG's Work
Where the Norms fell victim to their bold equation of states and
businesses, the GPs have succeeded in establishing corporate
responsibilities that leave the traditional conception of state-centric
human rights behind. They have even gained support from the rather

42. See Tebello Thabane, Weak ExtraterritorialRemedies: The Achilles Heel of Ruggie's
"Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework and GuidingPrinciples, 14 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J.
43, 60 (2014).
43. See David Bilchitz & Surya Deva, The Human Rights Obligations of Business: A
CriticalFrameworkfor the Future, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND
THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT?, supra note 29, at 1, 15.
44. The International Bill of Human Rights comprises of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
45. International Labour Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work (June 18, 1998).
46. ANNE PETERS, JENSEITS DER MENSCHENRECHTE: DIE
INDIVIDUUMS IM VOLKERRECHT 98 (2014).
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reluctant business world as well as capital-exporting states. Despite the
provoked storm of criticism, one has to acknowledge that the SRSG has
offered an authoritative, overarching system that was missing in the
49
deeply fragmented "plethora of voluntary initiatives."
Human rights advocates may view the displacement of pragmatism
by the SRSG as a weakness. Yet, a prolonged and ultimately potentially
failing process should not be preferred to the path the SRSG has taken.
The GPs may not be optimal and they do carry uncertainties and
shortcomings, but they are a comprehensive starting point for further
50
improvement and development in a still unfolding process.
While some see the focus of this process necessarily on the "soft"
Framework and the GPs and their implementation, others argue that it
must eventually lead to "hard" law. The next section will address the
latter calls and examine their potential for the protection of human
rights against corporate abuses.
II. "HARD" INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE SILVER BULLET OF HUmAN RIGHTS
AND BUSINESS?

Many argue that the GPs' major shortcoming is their nonbinding
nature and plead for the establishment of "hard" legal obligations for
businesses. Two separate areas of discussion must be distinguished. The
first area surrounds proposals to implement the human rights and
business issues into existing legal frameworks, thereby extending their
traditional scope and application, while the second focuses on the
creation of something entirely new.

A. Revisiting Existing Legal Regimes
The traditional state-centric view of public international law has
undergone changes only rather recently. Human rights instruments
grant individuals genuine international rights, and with the creation of
international criminal law, individuals have become subject to
international obligations not to commit certain international crimes.
While natural persons thus possess international rights and obligations,
legal persons enjoy strong rights, especially in investment law, without
being obligated to comply with human rights standards and without
being subject to international criminal jurisdiction. This obvious
49. Olivier De Schutter, Foreword:Beyond the Guiding Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT?, supra

note 29, at xv, xvii. See also UNHRC, Framework-Report, supra note 7, at
supra note 25, at 43.
50. De Schutter, supra note 49, at xviii.
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imbalance prompts the question to what extent could existing legal
regimes-namely, those of international human rights, criminal, and
investment law-be extended to include direct obligations for
businesses. Irrespective of the specific field, any reform must be well
balanced and consider potential side effects.
1. Human Rights Law
Subjecting private businesses to existing human rights regimes
faces conceptual obstacles that are at the very foundation of human
rights law: its state-centric nature that determines the applicability of
human rights treaties as well as the availability of international
remedies. With a dogmatically rather inconceivable re-interpretation of
existing rules, some have ambitiously proposed the development of new
fora that would enable holding private business entities liable in human
rights proceedings.
a. Existing Human Rights Frameworks
There is no mention of business enterprises, or of any entities other
than states for that matter, to carry human rights obligations in
existing human rights treaties. As corporate actors are generally seen
as not having international legal personality in the first place,51 the
direct imposition of human rights obligations on corporations would
thus entail a "radical departure from international law's state-centered
heritage." 52 Only individual voices in the literature have claimed that,
against the clear wording of the treaties in question, corporations also
hold legal obligations under human rights law. 53 Others have suggested
a new institutional regime based on both state and non-state

&

51. Out of many, see Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, How to Impose
Human Rights Obligations on Corporations Under Investment Treaties? Pragmatic
Guidelines for the Amendment of BITs, in Yearbook on International Investment Law
Policy 2011-2012 569, 572 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2013); Peter Muchlinski, Implementing
the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework- Implications for Corporate Law,
Governance, and Regulation, 22 Bus. Ethics Q. 145, 151 (2012).
52. Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, Beyond the 100 Acre Wood: In Which
InternationalHuman Rights Law Finds New Ways to Tame Global Corporate Power, 19
INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 828, 833 (2015).
53. See Jordan J. Paust, The Reality of PrivateRights, Duties, and Participationin the
InternationalLegal Process, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1229, 1242-43 (2004); Jordan J. Paust,
Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801,
817 (2002).
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elements, 54 but this appears more as a proposal for a new legal order
than a description of the existing one. Duties of corporations for the
benefit of individuals do exist in many fields of international law-for
instance in international labor law, international environmental law,
55
anti-corruption law, or with regard to UN sanctions -but they are not
phrased in terms of human rights.
Accordingly, existing courts and committees tasked to enforce
human rights statutes do not include the procedural possibility for
corporations to become parties before them. While different procedures
for different applicants exist-inter-state communications or individual
complaints 5 6-the subject against which one may initiate a procedure is
always the same: the state. Similarly, the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) makes clear that "[o]nly states may be parties in
57
cases before the Court."
b. A New Forum for CorporateHuman Rights Abuses?
Thus, the only way forward appears to be a new framework to deal
with cases of corporate human rights abuses. One option is to create a
general human rights court, while the other is to mandate a specialized
tribunal to adjudicate adverse human rights effects of business
activities.
In the spirit of the first option, Martin Scheinin and Manfred
Nowak, together with Julia Kozma, have notably proposed a statute for
a "World Court of Human Rights" that would rule on all issues relating
58
to human rights, including abuses by businesses. That way, one court
could be created that could deal with human rights issues in a
comprehensive and coherent manner and establish a straightforward
remedy for victims. It would increase attention to the field of business

54. See generally Stephen J. Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public
Responsibility: TransnationalPolitics, TransnationalFirms, and Human Rights, 19 Bus.
Ethics Q. 349 (2009) (advocating a hybrid public-private regime).
55. Ratner, supra note 6, at 475-88.
56. See articles 10 and 2, respectively, of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
57. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
58. See JULIA KOZMA, MANFRED NOWAK & MARTIN SCHEININ, A WORLD COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS - CONSOLIDATED STATUTE AND COMMENTARY arts. 4, 6 (2010); Manfred

Nowak, The Need for a World Court of Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 251 (2007);
Martin Scheinin, The Proposed Optional Protocolto the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: A Blueprint for UN Human Rights Treaty Body Reform - Without
Amending the Existing Treaties, 6 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 131 (2006).
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and human rights,5 9 and, given its nature as a court, it would likely
create a high(er) compliance rate-hopefully much different from the
case of individual complaints procedures under the Human Rights
Committee6 o and, in the best case, comparable with the compliance rate
of the ICJ.61
There are, however, also serious concerns about the prospects of
such a court: it would surely be overburdened quickly, comparable to the
situation in the European Court of Human Rights. 62 As a result, it
would not be able to address human rights violations in a timely
manner. There are further serious questions of how to ensure consistent
quality standards, both in terms of procedural and substantive law of
the court.63 What sounds like a strength at first sight-namely, one
jurisdiction over a variety of treaties-is at the same time a great
challenge. Judges would need to be experts in all subfields of human
rights in order to combine the different human rights treaties under one
roof. It is even more unclear how established jurisdictions and
interpretations of human rights regimes would relate to each other
when clashing within this new "super-jurisdiction" of the World Court.
In the end, the drawbacks of a World Court for the issue of human
rights and businesses should be considered. Besides the obvious
objection that states are not likely to agree on such a court, it is also
true that even if a World Court existed, states that are reluctant to
address corporate human rights abuses in the first place could submit
reservations with regard to the court's jurisdiction on human rights
abuses of corporations. 64 This way, states could easily circumvent the
jurisdiction of the new court for corporations and business enterprises.
59. See Geir Ulfstein, Do We Need a World Court of Human Rights?, in LAW AT WAR:
THE LAW AS IT WAS AND THE LAW AS IT SHOULD BE: LIBER AMICORUM OvE BRING 261, 263

(Ola Engdahl & Pil Wrange eds., 2008).
60. See Martin Scheinin, The InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, in
MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 48, 66 (Geir

Ulfstein ed., 2010); Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations:
What Role for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY MONITORING 15, 30 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
61.

See generally CONSTANZE

SCHULTE,

COMPLIANCE

WITH

DECISIONS

OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 271 (2004) (discussing the compliance history of the
ICJ).
62. See generally THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY APPLICATIONS
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS (ULRIKE DEUTSCH & RIDIGER WOLFRUM eds., 2009)

(discussing reforms that are necessary to prevent a failure of the European system of
human rights protection).
63. See also Ulfstein, supranote 59, at 263-67.
64. This would raise the interesting question to what extent states could create such a
reservation and, in particular, whether the new Statute should explicitly exclude such a
reservation or whether such reservation would be incompatible with its object and

A TREATY

ON ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST BUSINESS

57

Instead of creating one court for all human rights issues, recent
proposals focus on establishing a specialized "International Arbitration
Tribunal on Business and Human Rights" at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.6 5 This proposal could benefit from the (positive) experiences
corporations have gathered from international investment arbitration,
potentially reducing their bias to reject such an institution in principle.
It could further provide a neutral and objective forum with human
rights experts as arbitrators and with proceedings free from the
restrictions many domestic laws impose with regard to extraterritorial
66
disputes and similar issues.
A specialized forum for business and human rights issues may thus
be preferable to one giant institution. Still, the current proposal suffers
from several weaknesses: it neither solves the issue of whether
corporations actually possess human rights obligations (but apparently
assumes that they do), nor does it secure the enforcement of arbitral
awards.6 7 The biggest challenge of choosing arbitration rather than
(national or international) courts as a dispute settlement mechanism is
that all arbitrations require an agreement, which necessarily includes
consent by the parties. 68 In the event of a corporate human rights abuse,
it seems unclear what incentives may exist as to why a corporation
should agree to such arbitration instead of using the existing legal
loopholes to avoid proceedings altogether. Creating incentives that serve
business interests, however, could counter the very function of such a
tribunal, namely, the effective enforcement against corporate human
rights violations. Instead of relying on voluntary participation, states
could force them into such proceedings. Still, states could establish such
a legal requirement more easily with regard to domestic legal
proceedings where dispute parties usually already have a duty to
participate.
In conclusion, international human rights law does not yet include
obligations of corporate actors and accordingly does not offer a remedy

purpose, see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
65. See Claes Cronstedt & Robert C. Thompson, An InternationalArbitration Tribunal
on Business and Human Rights: Version Five, LAW. BETTER BUS. (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.14bb.org/news/TribunalV5B.pdf.
66. See id.; Maria Norris, Access to Remedy: An International Tribunal for Business
and Human Rights? LONDON SCHOOL OF ECON. & POL. Scl.: HUM. RTS. BLOG (Oct. 10,
2014), http-/blogs.1se.ac.uk/humanrights/2014/10/08/access-to-remedy-an-international-tribunal-forbusiness-and-human-rights/.
67. See Donald Earl Childress III, Is an InternationalArbitral Tribunal the Answer to
the Challenges of Litigating TransnationalHuman Rights Cases in a Post-Kiobel World?,
19 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 31, 45 (2015); Norris, supra note 66, 1 7.
68. See Norris, supra note 66, 11 6.
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for victims of abuses. Change is desirable, but hard to achieve, as it
would constitute a fundamental departure from the traditional
conception of human rights as rights between individuals and the state.
Private persons-natural as well as, to a limited extent, legal ones-are
not those obligated, but those protected by human rights law. To change
that would require a completely new treaty-a prospect discussed at a
later point in this article.69 In contrast, international criminal law is one
area of international law where the individual is already obligated.
2. InternationalCriminalLaw
Under international criminal law, the individual is under a direct
international obligation to not commit certain core crimes. Legal
persons may have the same obligations, 70 but they are, in any event, not
subject to international criminal liability, as, most importantly, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) has no jurisdiction over them.
Extending the scope of that jurisdiction over legal entities-a feature
well known in many domestic criminal legal orders 71-promises to be an
important and potentially effective step to address corporate
involvement in international crimes. The costs of immediate realization
of this step seem, however, to be very high in the near future.
a. The Recent Success of the Rome Statute
With the entry into force of the Rome Statute (RS)7 2 and the
establishment of the ICC in 2002, the field of international criminal law
has made a great leap forward. It has received large support in the
international community, with the RS currently holding 139 signatories
and 124 members, including all South American as well as many
European and African States. 73 However, some powerful States like
China and Russia have not joined; and the U.S. objects fiercely to the
court. 74
69. See infra Part II.B.
70. See ECOSOC, Interim report, supra note 30, at 1 61; Andrew Clapham, Extending
InternationalCriminal Law Beyond the Individual to Corporationsand Armed Opposition
Groups, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 899 (2008).
71. See Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 417-27 (2007).
72. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
73. For the status of ratifications, see UN Treaty Collection, https1/treaties.un.org/pages
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XVII-10&chapter-18&lang-en (last visited Nov. 12,
2016).
74. For a critical appraisal, see Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International
Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 89 (2003).
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The ICC holds jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, as well as war crimes, and will hold jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression in the future. There are three ways in which the
ICC may exercise its jurisdiction, namely, if the accused is a national of
a state party; if the alleged crime occurs on the territory of a member
state; or if the UN Security Council refers a situation to the ICC.
However, according to Article 17(1) RS, the court shall only determine a
case to be admissible if a state that would otherwise hold jurisdiction
over the case is either unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation
or prosecution genuinely (so-called principle of complementarity).
Article 25(3)(c) RS emphasizes that the perpetrator is not the only
person responsible; whoever aids, abets, or otherwise assists in the
commission of a crime (or its attempt) can also be punished. In this way,
individuals holding responsible positions within corporations that
support the commission of core crimes through, for example, suppliers of
arms or poisonous substances to enable genocide may face international
criminal prosecution75 if they fulfill all the elements of the crime in
question. However, the jurisdiction of the ICC only extends to natural
persons (within corporations). The legal person itself remains excluded
from international criminal liability.
b. Extending InternationalCriminal Jurisdictionover Legal
Persons?
During the drafting conference of the RS in 1998, the French and
the Solomon Islands delegations submitted a proposal to extend the
ICC's jurisdiction to cover legal persons "when the crimes committed
were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or
representatives."76 This proposal was largely influenced, inter alia, by
the role of radio stations, such as Radio Rwanda and Radio T6livision
Libre des Milles Collines, in encouraging the genocide of the Tutsi in
Rwanda.77 For a long time, it looked like a principle of corporate
criminal liability would indeed be feasible, but the proposal was
78
eventually rejected as there was not enough time to reach consensus.
75. See generally William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian
Law: Catching the Accomplices, 83 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 439 (2001) (examining the
possibility of criminal prosecution for accomplices within a business).
76. Cited by Natalya S. Pak & James P. Nussbaumer, Beyond Impunity: Strengthening
the Legal Accountability of Transnational Corporations for Human Rights Abuses 40
(Hertie Sch. of Governance, Working Paper No. 45, 2009), http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/vollte
xte/2013/4259/pdf/45.pdf.
77. Id.
78. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE 425-27 (2010).
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At the first revision of the RS in 2010 in Kampala, proposals to
extend the ICC's jurisdiction to corporations were originally on the
agenda of the conference, but the Conference's preoccupation with the
new crime of aggression eventually sidelined these proposals.79 In the
academic literature, extending the ICC's jurisdiction in this way has
found quite a few supporters. Authors have argued, for instance, that
criminal liability cannot be connected back to individuals in all
instances, but that corporate strategy may sometimes constitute the
true cause for the criminal conduct. Further, the deterring effect is
considered significantly bigger if the corporation itself can be held liable
so that corporate assets can pay potential damages.8 0
However, there are significant caveats that the extension of
international criminal liability to corporations would hold. First,
international criminal law covers only the worst of all crimes. While all
international crimes entail severe human rights violations, the opposite
is not true: the reach of human rights law goes much beyond the narrow
scope of international criminal law. Even if the jurisdiction of the ICC
were to be extended to legal persons, this would be no more than a drop
in the ocean. Most aspects discussed as part of CSR would not be
covered.
Second, most of the crimes in their current form are clearly tailored
for perpetrators to be natural persons. States would need to adjust large
parts of the RS to address specific corporate criminal liability. Some
general provisions such as complicity or intent would need to be
significantly altered, but potentially even the wording of the four core
crimes themselves would need to be subjected to revision. This would
start a complicated and lengthy process with uncertain results.
Lastly, and maybe most importantly, the court is still struggling to
receive recognition from some of the key players. It has certainly gained
recognition over the last years thanks to the considerate course of action
that the Chief Prosecutors chose for the court. Some states remain
skeptical, if not hostile. Recently, Russia has withdrawn its signature
from the RS, and the Republic of South Africa (RSA), as well as other
African states, have announced to quit the ICC,81 unfortunately
79. Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International
Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 43, 45 (2013).
80. See Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporationsand the International Criminal Court: The
Complementarity Objection Stripped Bare, 19 CRIM. L.F. 115, 148-49 (2008). See generally
Nora Gotzmann, Legal Personality of the Corporation and International Criminal
Law: Globalisation, Corporate Human Rights Abuses and the Rome Statute, 1
QUEENSLAND L. STUDENT REV. 36 (2008) (arguing in favor of extending the ICC's
jurisdiction).
81. Shaun Walker & Owen Bowcott, Russia Withdraws Signature from International
Criminal Court Statute, GUARDIAN, httpsJ/www.theguardian.com/
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delivering a significant blow to the ICC and its efforts in promoting
international criminal justice. An international court can only be as
successful as the states allow it to be. It would thus be
counterproductive for the acceptance of the ICC in the next years to
take another much-contested topic aboard. International criminal law
should not do too much too soon. Having said that, one of the necessary
future steps should undoubtedly be the court's extension of jurisdiction
over corporations. Although narrow in its application, international
criminal law does address highly important issues for which an
amendment of the RS or a specialized self-standing protocol seems a
feasible option. However, for the sake of the ICC's young history and
mixed acceptance, the time does not seem ripe for it yet.
While the international criminal jurisdiction thus does not deal with
corporations directly, international investment law is specifically
designed to address investors, most of which are businesses, by offering
a significant shield against unjust state intrusion in the investment.
While corporations benefit from that legal order, the question of legal
obligations of businesses states an unresolved problem in criminal as
well as investment law.
3. InternationalInvestment Law
The international law on the protection of foreign investments,
comprising of over three thousand bilateral investment treaties and
many multilateral instruments, usually does not address human rights
at all.82 These treaties award investors protection and -give them
capability to enforce their rights vis-a-vis the host state before arbitral
tribunals.88 Such international investment agreements (HAs), however,
generally do not place obligations on investors, but only on the state
parties. 84 The relationship of corporate rights and obligations under
investment law thus mirrors the asymmetry observable in international
law in general.

world/2016/nov/16/russia-withdraws-signature-from-international-criminal-court-statute (last visited
Nov. 16, 2016).
82. MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 227 (3d ed. 2010).
83. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 51, at 573.
84. UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Social Responsibility 17,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/22 (Mar. 31, 2001); Yannick Radi, Realizing Human Rights in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from within the International Investment
Law Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 1107, 1110 (2012).
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While some have warned that including human rights obligations in
IIAs would only add to their complexity and create legal uncertainty,8 5
many argue that incorporating expressive obligation clauses is the best
way to cure investment law of its imbalance. Explicit investor
obligations are said to reconcile both the relationship between investors
and host states as well as that between investment and human rights
law in general.86 However, as sporadic implementation of such human
rights clauses could be circumvented by so-called treaty shopping87 or by
invoking most-favored-nation clauses,88 careful and widespread reform
would be needed to effectively address investors' human rights
responsibilities.
Even if such clauses were implemented, their enforcement would
remain a struggle.89 Under the existing IIA design, investors' own
conduct is only of limited relevance.9 0 For example, case law suggests
that investor conduct may justify reducing the amount of
compensation 1 or even lead to the dismissal of the claim. 92 Although it

85. MARC JACOB, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 36-

37 (2010), available at http /vww.humanrights-business.org/filesfinternational investnentagreem
ents-and human rights.pdf (instead favoring the strengthening of human rights instruments
and their role in investment law).
86. See, e.g., Jernej Letnar Cernid, Corporate Human Rights Obligations Under
Stabilization Clauses, 11 GERMAN L.J. 210, 266-67 (2010); Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin,
supra note 51, at 581-82; Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor
Protection:A New Approach for a Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 429
(2004) (suggesting a counterclaim mechanism allowing individuals to bring claims against
foreign investors for the violation of human rights); GABRIEL BOrTINI, EXTENDING
RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2015), available at http://el5initiati

ve.org/wp-cntent/uploads/2015/07/E15-Investment-Bottini-FINALpdf

HOWARD MANN, KONRAD

VON MOLTKE, LUKE ERIC PETERSON & AARON COSBEY, IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 10 (2005), available at

https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-model-intagreement.pdf.
87. LUKE ERIC PETERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
MAPPING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 15

(2009), available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/coHection_2012/dd-rd/E84-36-2009eng.pdf.
88. See generally Robin Gei8l & Meinhard HiM, Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (Riidiger Wolfrum ed., 2014)

(defining most-favoured-nation clauses and explaining their proper uses).
89.

See HOWARD MANN,

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, BUSINESS

AND

HUMAN RIGHTS: KEY ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES 14 (2008) availableat https/www.iisd.org/
pdf/2008/iia-business-humanrights.pdf
90. See Andrew Newcombe, Investor Misconduct, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 195 (Armand de Mestral & C61ine Lvesque eds., 2013);
Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 51, at 589-94.
91. E.g. Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russia, Case No. AA 227, Award ¶¶ 1614-15, 1647
(Perm. Ct. Arb., July 18, 2014) (deducting 25% because of the claimant's own tax evasion
strategies); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Chile, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/17, Award,
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is conceivable to apply such approaches, albeit with legal uncertainty, to
93
corporate human rights abuses, they would only become relevant as a
defense for the host state to limit its own liability.
Similarly, counterclaims by the host state are permissible only
within the scope of consent by the parties to the dispute and further
94
Broadly formulated
require a connection to the primary claim.
arbitration clauses granting jurisdiction over "all disputes" may cover
95
counterclaims based on investor human rights abuses, but many HAs
deny the host state standing in that respect. Allowing for such
counterclaims in HAs, as well as in contracts concluded between the
host state and the investor directly, would thus require additional
96
reform and specific negotiation.
Beyond that, vesting host states with the genuine right to bring a
claim directly against the investor would need even further reform, as it
97
would require consent by the investor. Under HAs, the state usually
expresses its standing offer to arbitrate through the IIA's arbitration
98
clause-the investor accepts this offer by initiating proceedings.

ill 178, 243 (May 25, 2004) (deducting 50% of the damage claim based on the investor's
negligent business decisions).
92. See, e.g., Metal-Tech v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award
11 372-74 (Oct. 4, 2013); Inceysa Vallisoletana v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/26, Award, 11 248-52 (Aug. 2, 2006). The reasons for dismissal, however, differ
and depend heavily on the individual treaty, see Jason Webb Yackee, Investment Treaties
and Investor Corruption:An EmergingDefense for Host States?, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 723,
731-32 (2012).
93. See loana Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and Human
Rights Norms, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
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310, 338-42 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds.,
2009); Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 51, at 573-96; Patrick Dumberry
Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, When and How Allegations of Human Rights Violations Can Be
Raised in Investor-State Arbitration, 13 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 349 (2012). See generally
Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor Under
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 527 (2006) (arguing
that the fair and equitable treatment standard includes an investor duty to avoid
unconscionable conduct)..
94. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 51, at 595-96; see also, e.g., Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
art. 46, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
95. See, e.g., Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on
Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic's Counterclaim 1 39 (May 7, 2004).
96. See, e.g., Helene Bubrowski, BalancingHA Arbitration Through the Use of
Counterclaims, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, 212 (Armand de

Mestral & C61ine IUvesque eds., 2013) (suggesting the desirability in expanding
possibilities for counterclaims); Gustavo Laborde, The Case for Host State Claims in
Investment Arbitration, 1 J. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 97 (2010) (arguing in favor of improving
possibilities for counterclaims).
97. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 51, at 597.
98. SORNARAJAH, supra note 82, at 306.
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However, if the state initiated a claim, consent of the investor would be
missing.
Ultimately, the potential of investment law in the field of business
and human rights must not be overrated.99 HAs and arbitration rules
are not meant to constitute a primary forum for human rights litigation.
Arbitral proceedings depend on the investor's consent, and raising
allegations of human rights abuses during such proceedings lays in the
discretion of the host state. That state may be better off to address
human rights abuses through its own domestic (criminal) law. However,
when it is unable or unwilling to do so, investment law does not offer
abuse victims or civil society any additional remedy. The victims play
only a small role in it, if any. Widespread and comprehensive reform
would be necessary to contribute effectively to the enforcement of
investors' human rights responsibilities. 100 Efforts to this end, however,
would most likely be unpromising. Investment law, serving the
protection of investors, is not the right avenue to establish individual
protection from them. Arbitral tribunals hardly possess the competence
or legitimacy to enforce investors' compliance with human rights in a
satisfying manner. 101

Altogether, our rather skeptical assessment does not mean that
human rights should not play a greater role in investment law. If
human rights compliance became a condition for investment protection,
investors would be prompted to comply with their responsibilities if they
did not wish to jeopardize their own protection and compensation
claims. 102 Likewise, direct negotiations between states and investors
over investment projects should include, inter alia, human rights risks
assessments and avoidance or mitigation strategies.103 Small steps in
this direction can already be observed in some recent IIAs that do not
aim at establishing legally binding investor obligations, but that still

&

99. Also skeptical, see Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human
Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
International Institute for Sustainable Development 18 (2003), https//www.iisd.orgpdfl2003/
investment mt_human rights bits.pdf
100. But see Horatia Muir Watt, The Contested Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration
and the Human Rights Ordeal: The Missing Link, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CONTENDING THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 214, 216 (Walter Mattli
Thomas Dietz eds., 2014) (contending that holding an investor accountable for human
rights violations before an investment arbitration tribunal could be possible even "without
any radical change in the applicable law", based on "horizontal effects" of human rights
obligations of the investor's State of origin).
101. Peterson & Gray, supra note 99, at 33, 36.
102. Cf. id., at 36.
103. See UN Human Rights Council, Principles for Responsible Contracts:Integrating
the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations:
Guidancefor Negotiators, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3 (May 25, 2011).

A TREATY ON ENFORCING HuMAN RIGHTS AGAINST BUSINESS

65

refer to investors' CSR.104 That way, IIAs and state contracts could help
to establish and solidify international human rights standards for
investors and thus contribute to include these standards in their
operation.
4. Conclusion:Human Rights and Business in Existing Legal
Regimes
The brief excursion through the fields of international human
rights, criminal, and investment law has illustrated significant
regulatory gaps in the field of business and human rights. Some of the
reform proposals may be desirable but seem unachievable in the near
future. Rules of international investment law are not meant to
constitute a forum for human rights litigation; an extension of the ICC's
jurisdiction would only cover extreme and rare cases, and will have to be
well considered given that opposition to this young court is already
significant. Finally, establishing a new forum that could address
corporate human rights abuses may have theoretical potential to
provide individuals with an effective remedy, but it would be built on
the premise of existing human rights obligations. Pursuing singular
reform in different legal arenas can thus only lead to a patchwork with
significant holes and thin twines. If the key to this issue lies within
"hard" international law, a specialized business and human rights
treaty deserves close attention.
B. A Business and Human Rights Treaty: Cutting the GordianKnot or
Getting Tangled Up
Unsurprisingly, in the face of the existing protection and
accountability gaps, many have spoken out in favor of a binding
105
In a parallel
business and human rights treaty to fill the loophole.
GPs, recent
of
the
process
implementation
the
to
further
development
initiatives have put the creation of a new treaty back on the UNHRC's
agenda. Still, and apart from the specifics of this new development, the
question remains whether a treaty on business and human rights would
truly solve the problems associated with enforcing corporate human
104. See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation and Investment Facilitation, Braz.-Mozam.,
art. 10, annex II, Mar. 30, 2015; Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Peru, art. 810, May 29,
2008; Norway Draft Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 28
(May 13, 2015).
105. See, e.g., Deva, supra note 41; Blitt, supra note 26; Treaty Alliance: Global
Movement for a Binding Treaty, TREATY MOVEMENT, http://treatymovement.com (last
visited Dec. 20, 2016).
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rights responsibilities. The crux of the treaty proposal thus is whether
such an international agreement would cut the Gordian knot 06 of the
business and human rights issue, or rather whether it poses the threat
of getting tangled up in the process.
1. Recent Steps Toward a Legally Binding Instrument Within the
UN Human Rights Council
In September 2013, Ecuador and the RSA called in the UNHRC for
an "international legally binding instrument .

.

. [which] would clarify

the obligations of transnational corporations in the field of human
rights." 0 7 The sponsoring states, supported by the African and the Arab
groups, as well as several South American and Asian States,108 found
such a step necessary to "provide appropriate protection, justice and
remedy to the victims of human rights abuses directly resulting from or
related to the activities of some transnational corporations and other
business enterprises." 0 9 The GPs, though being supported in principle,
were labeled "a first step, but without a legally binding instrument, it
will remain only as such: a 'first step' without further consequence.""i0
Almost ten months later, in July 2014, the UNHRC adopted
Resolution 26/9 answering this initiative.111 It established an "OpenEnded
Intergovernmental
Working
Group
on
Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human
Rights" that is mandated "to elaborate an international legally binding
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises."ll 2 The
working group's first two sessions were dedicated to conduct
constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature, and form of the

106. The Gordian knot was, according to Greek mythology, an intricate knot tied by
King Gordius of Phrygia and cut by Alexander the Great with his sword in 333 BC. An
oracle had promised that whoever could unravel it would be the next ruler of Asia.
GordianKnot, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?qgordian+knot (last accessed Dec. 20, 2016).
107. Republic of Ecuador, Statement on Behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24rd [sic]
Session of the Human Rights Council, General Debate - Item 3: "Transnational
Corporationsand Human Rights"I1 6 (Sept. 1, 2013), available at http://business-humanright
s.org/sites/default/files/mediadocuments/statement-unhre-legally-binding.pdf
108. The statement was delivered in the name of the African Group, the Arab Group,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, and
Ecuador. Id., at 1| 1.
109. Id., at 11 3.
110. Id., at 11 4.
111. UN Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014).
112. Id., at 11 1.
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future instrument.11 3 The first session's various panel discussions were
held in light of this mandate in July 2015.114 The second session took
place in October 2016.115
The Resolution, which was co-sponsored by Bolivia, Cuba, the RSA,
and Venezuela, was adopted with a rather thin majority of twenty votes
in favor (including a majority of African States, China, India, and
Russia), fourteen votes against (including EU States, the U.S., and
Japan), and thirteen abstaining (notably all Latin American states
116
The voting result already suggests that
apart from the cosponsors).
117
Some observers have
the entire initiative is highly controversial.
8
welcomed it with great enthusiasm.11 They argue that binding human
rights obligations on corporations are simply indispensable to fully
protect human rights.11 9 The GPs' shortcomings are to be corrected by
113. Id., at 1 2.
114. Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garc6s (UN Human Rights Council ChairpersonRapporteur), Draft Rep. of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human
Rights (July 10, 2015).
115. UN Human Rights Council, Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Grp. on
Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enter, with Respect to Human Rights, Draft Report
on the Second Session (Oct. 28, 2016), available at httpJ/www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
HRCWGTransCorp/Session2fPages/Session2.aspx.
116. Votes in favor: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, C6te d'Ivoire, Cuba,
Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines,
Russian Fed'n, South Africa, Venezuela, and Viet Nam; votes against: Austria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Republic of
Korea, Romania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, U.K., and the U.S.;
abstaining: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives,
Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, U.A.E. See UN Human Rights Council Res.
26/9, supra note 111, at 3.
117. See U.S. Council for International Business, Employers Reaffirm Commitment to
UN Principleson Business and Human Rights, U.S. COUNCIL INT'L Bus. (June 30, 2014),
http://www.uscib.org/employers-reaffirm-commitment-to-un-principles-on-business-andhuman-rights-ud-4771/; Arvind Ganesan & Juliette de Rivero, Letter to the UN Human
Rights Council Re: Business and Human Rights, HUM. RTs. WATCH (June 10, 2014),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/10/letter-un-human-rights-council-re-business-andhuman-rights.
118. See, e.g., Enhance the International Legal Framework to Protect Human Rights
from CorporateAbuse, TREATY ALLIANCE (Dec. 2, 2013), httpJ/www.treatyiovementcom/stat
ement; Ganesan & Rivero, supra note 117 (noting "a groundswell of support among global
civil society organizations").
119. See Cindy S. Woods, "It Isn't a State Problem": The Minas Conga Mine Controversy
and the Need for Binding InternationalObligations on CorporateActors, 46 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 629, 633, 670-71 (2015). See generally David Bilchitz, The Necessity for a Business and
Human Rights Treaty, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTs. J. 203 (2016) (arguing for a business and
human rights a treaty to "'provide legal solutions to cure serious lacunae and ambiguities
in the current framework of international law which have a serious negative impact upon
the rights of individuals affected by corporate activities.").
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creating binding force and establishing adequate remedies for victims of
human rights abuses. The International Federation for Human Rights
(FIDH), for instance, called the new initiative "significant" and a
"promising step towards corporate accountability," echoing a "global
call" by hundreds of civil society organizations and social movements. 120
Most observers, however, have commented on the new initiative
with severe criticism, alleging substantial flaws, as well as attacking
the process as such.
a. The "Too Abstract and Too Restrictive" Critique
Critics argue that the proposed treaty attempts to establish a "onesize-fits-all" solution. 121 Given the variety of businesses and
corporations involved and the very different nature of their potential
human rights abuses, a treaty would need to have a very broad and
abstract content.122 Namely, Ruggie argues that covering all
constellations would exhibit extensive problems with diversity,
institutional variation, and conflicting interests across states, 123 and
that it is unclear which human rights, if not all, should be included in
the new treaty and by which means they would be selected.1 24 This, in
turn, could make the treaty a huge legal instrument that would be hard

120. Significant Vote at the UN Human Rights Council: Ray of Hope to Address
Corporate Abuses, Yet Important Concerns Remain, FIDH (June 26, 2015),
https1/www.fidh.org/enlissues/globalisation-human-rights/business-and-human-rights/15658significant-vote-at-the-un-human-rights-council-ray-of-hope-to-address; see also, e.g., Statement to
the Human Rights Council in Support of the Initiative of a Group of States for a LegallyBindingInstrument of TransnationalCorporations, STOP CORP. IMPUNITY (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://www.stopcorporateimpunity.org/?p=3830.
121. See Stephen Townley, Explanation of Vote: A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 on BHR
Legally-Binding Instrument: Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America,
U.S. MISSION GENEVA (June 26, 2014), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/
06/26/proposed-working-group-would-undermine-efforts-to-implement-guiding-principleson-business-and-human-rights/ (stating that "a one-size-fits-all instrument is not the right
approach to handling the complex fabric that is regulation of business").
122. JOHN RUGGIE, A UN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY? AN ISSUE BRIEF 3

(2014), available at http//www.hks.harvarcLedu/m-rcbg/CSRI/UNBusinessandHumanRightsTrea
ty.pdt JOHN RUGGIE, GET REAL, OR WE'LL GET NOTHING: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON A BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS

TREATY 1-2 (2015), availableat http://www.hks.harvard.edu/index.php/content/download/
77052/1729783/version/l/file/GET+REALRuggie.pdf (criticizing the lack of a "specific
focus").
123. John Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN Business and
Human Rights Treaty, INST. HUM. RTS. & BUS. (Jul. 8, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commen
tary/past-as-prologue.html.
124. RUGGIE, A UN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY, supra note 122, at 4.
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125
A treaty that attempts to
to monitor and even harder to enforce.
establish a "one-size-fits-all" solution would thus be at risk of creating a
"one-size-fits-none" framework instead. Ironically, the allegations raised
against the GPs that they were too abstract and too vague would also be
true with regard to a new treaty. The treaty could insofar fail to
eradicate perceived shortcomings of the GPs. There, the need for
clarified standards and concrete recommendations toward an improved
situation of victims of corporate human rights abuses exists as well, but
the process for further specification has already begun.
A second point of critique on the substance of UNHRC Resolution
26/9 is its limitation to business enterprises "that have a transnational
character in their operational activities," thereby excluding "local
businesses." 126 Yet, there exists no compelling reason why domestic
127
enterprises, where many human rights abuses are in fact committed,
128
Otherwise, a treaty would impose
should not be held liable.
obligations onto some corporations while sparing others from any
responsibility. This suggests that a political agenda to target specific
businesses drives the adoption of the proposals, rather than a desire to
create a comprehensive legal framework. 129

b. The "Lengthy, Undermining, and Unrealistic"Critique
Besides these substantial reservations, the new initiative is also
vulnerable to concerns that address the entire process of establishing a
treaty as such. First, such process would be very lengthy, while
business-related abuses of human rights need to be addressed

125. Id., at 3.
126. UN Human Rights Council, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, RSA, and Venezuela, Draft
Res.: Resolution Elaboration of an Internationally Legally Binding Instrument on
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human
Rights, 2 n.1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014).
127. European Union, Submission to the Inter-Governmental Working Group on the
Elaboration of an International Legally-Binding Instrument on Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights at 2 (2015),
at
available
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Sessionl/Pages/WrittenContribut
ions.aspx ("The focus on solely transnational corporations ... neglects the fact that many
abuses are committed by enterprises at the domestic level, thus undermining a
fundamental element of the UNGPs that cover all businesses, regardless of whether firms
are transnational.").
128. See U.S. Council for International Business, supra note 117 (referring to
statements by the International Organization of Employers); FIDH, supra note 120.
129. Larry CatA Backer, Moving Forward the UN Guiding Principles for Business and
Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the
Treaty that Might Bind Them All, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 457, 534 (2015).
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immediately. 130 For example, Ecuador anticipates a process of up to one
decade or longer.1 3 1 This resembles in many ways the fate of the 1970s
TNC Code of Conduct, which was discussed over several decades before
finally being abandoned in the 1990S.1 32 The question of what to do in
the timeframe from the present to the distant future (when a legally
binding regime is established) remains unanswered by the supporters of
the new initiative.1 33
The GPs, as the first (albeit smallest) common denominator, could,
of course, still fill this gap. Secondly, however, the new initiative
threatens to undermine their effectiveness.1 34 Critics fear that the
initiative might polarize and reopen gaps that were long hoped to be
overcome.135 It, indeed, was a long way to reach a consensus on the
principles, a consensus that is seen as a powerful and authoritative
guidance and a "trusted approach"1 36 for both states and businesses.137
The new initiative, however, could cost time and money that would be

130. RUGGIE, A UN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY?, supra note 122, at 3; Nicole
R. Tuttle, Human Rights Council Resolutions 26/9 and 26/22: Towards Corporate
Accountability?, 19 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS (2015), available at https://www.asil.org/insig
hts/volume/19/issue/20/human-rights-council-resolutions-269-and-2622-towards-corporate.
Others
estimate a timeframe of five to ten years. See Cooperation Internationale pour le
Dbveloppement et la Sohdarit6 (CIDSE), Business & Human Rights: Engaging New Action
at International and National Levels 2 (CIDSE note, July 4, 2014), available at
http://www.cidse.org/publications/business-and-human-rights/business-and-human-rightsframeworks/un-business-hr-engaging-new-action-at-national-and-international-level-tostop-abuses.html.
131. RUGGIE, A UN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY?, supra note 122, at 5.

132. See supra Part I.A.
133.

RUGGIE, A UN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY, supra note 122, at 5 ("No

future treaty, real or imagined, can substitute for the need to achieve further progress in
the here and now.").
134. See NICOLAS CARRILLO-SANTARELLI & JERNEJ LETNAR CERNI, MADRID WORKSHOP
ON A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS - SUMMARY OF DEBATES 3 (Madrid, June

26, 2015) (citing Chiara Macchi); Townley, supra note 121 ("This action contradicts the
consensus-based approach of John Ruggie's mandate and the first few years of the UN
Guiding Principles.").
135. UN Human Rights Council Res. L22-EU EoV 2 (July 13, 2014) (stating that "the
resolution ... unnecessarily polarized the debate as if there could be two camps, in favour
and against progress on prevention of and remedy to business-related human rights
abuses."); Townley, supra note 121 ("It will unduly polarize these issues, taking us back
ten years to the days of the Commission on Human Rights."); see also Backer, supra note
127, at 531 (calling the new initiative "anachronistic").
136. U.S. Council for International Business, supra note 117.
137. See RUGGIE, A UN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY?,

Ganesan & de Rivero, supra note 117.

supra note 122;
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38
taken from initiatives to promote the GPs,s which makes the
progressive congruence of both initiatives unlikely.13 9 Although
supporters understand the two initiatives-creating a treaty and
140
relying on the GPs-as being complimentary or mutually reinforcing,
the voting result of HRC Resolution 26/9, as well as statements of
disapproving states, suggests to the contrary that the factions of
supporters and opponents of the treaty initiative are-just as at the
time of the UN Norms-sharply divided once more.
Third, under these auspices, a success of the initiative is not
realistic. The attendance of the new working group's meetings was poor.
Interventions were often only made by the sponsoring states and many
important home countries of transnational corporations; in particular,
European and North-American states did not attend the meetings at
all.141 Previous supporters of Resolution 26/9, most prominently Russia,
have withdrawn their support, while others, most prominently the
European Union, left the working group disappointedly after having
attended its first session.142
Accordingly and parallel to the new developments, the UNHRC
adopted a second Resolution on the issue of business and human rights,
extending the mandate of the previously established UN Working Group
on Business and Human Rights that is tasked with the implementation
of the GPs.1 43 This Resolution was put forward by a "core group"
consisting of Argentina, Ghana, Norway, and Russia, and supported by
144
It
more than forty additional cosponsors and adopted by consensus.
to
need
the
focuses, in contrast to the Ecuador-RSA initiative, on
implement the existing GPs and aims to support states in developing
"National Action Plans" to do so. It is thus an initiative not to start a
new process, but rather to continue the previously started one.

138. Townley, supra note 121 ('The focus will turn to the new instrument, and
companies, states, and others are unlikely to invest significant time and money in
implementing the UN Guiding Principles ....
139. See Tuttle, supra note 130.
140. Sara Blackwell & Nicole Vander Meulen, Two Roads Converged: The Mutual
Complementarity of a Binding Business and Human Rights Treaty and National Action
Planson Business and Human Rights, 6 NOTRE DAME J. INT'L COMP. L. 51 (2016); Press
release, FIDH, Human Rights Council Renews Mandate of the UN Working Group on
Business and Human Rights (June 27, 2014), availableat https://www.fidh.org/en/issue
s/globalisation-human-rights/15669-human-rights-council-renews-mandate-of-the-unworking-group-on-business.
141. See RUGGIE, A UN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY?, supra note 122.

142. Id. at 2.
143. United Nations Human Rights Council Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22
(July 15, 2014).
144. Kateiina Sequensovi (Rapporteur on the HRC Report), Rep. on its Twenty-Sixth
Session, T¶ 247, 252, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/2 (Dec. 11, 2014).
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The new development thus is unfortunate with regard to the
development and implementation of the GPs. The worst-case scenario
could be that quarrels over the new initiatives would shatter the
previously achieved consensus on the GPs.145 Either way, if such a
significant number of states-what is more, most states that are home
to the biggest companies in the world-oppose the new initiative, the
split into two groups of states will be fatal to the new treaty. If many
states are very unlikely to ratify it or even participate in its drafting
process, that new treaty would hardly make a difference for establishing
human rights obligations of major transnational corporations and their
home states. 146 A new treaty, under the premises of the new initiative,
would confine itself to mere semantics and symbolism that could do
more harm than good.1 47
2. Prospects of a Treaty Against CorporateHuman Rights Abuses
The criticism of the new initiative is overwhelming, but even if the
specifics of that case are left aside, an even more fundamental question
remains unanswered: "Can a legally binding instrument, even if
brought to life, actually contribute to the effective protection against
corporate human rights abuses?"1 48 Calls for a new treaty seem to be
based on the premise that a treaty would be the "silver bullet" for the
issue of business and human rights-a premise that is challenged very

&

145. Also, two of the most significant business networks oppose the new initiative
fiercely. See Intermational Chamber of Commerce, ICC Disappointed by Ecuador
Initiative Adoption (June 30, 2014), http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2014/ICCdisappointed-by-Ecuador-Initiative-adoption/; International Organization of Employers,
Consensus on Business and Human Rights is Broken with the Adoption of the Ecuador
0
Initiative (June 26, 2014), httpJAww.ioe-emp.org/fileadmin/oe documents/publications/Policy /OAr
easksdEN/')144)6-26&_G566_nnsus-onBusiness_and Human Rights is
brokenwitheeAdoptionofteuadorInitiative.pdf
146. See RUGGIE, A UN BuSINESs AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY?, supra note 122 at 2;
Ganesan & de Rivero, supra note 117..
147. See Backer, supra note 127, at 534; Chris Esdaile, Solicitory, Leigh Day,
Presentation Given at the University of Notre Dame Law School and Business & Human
Rights Resource Centre First Annual London Human Rights Speaker Series Event: Does
the World Need a Treaty on Business and Human Rights? 2 (May 14, 2014).
http://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/medialdocuments/chrisesdaile-ndu-tal
kmay20l4_fulltext.pdf.
148. For possible options of drawing up a business and human rights treaty, see
Douglass Cassell & Anita Ramasastry, White Paper: Options For a Treaty on Business and
Human Rights, 6 NOTRE DAME J. INT'L COMP. L. 1 (2016); Bonita Meyersfeld, A Binding
Instrument on Business and Human Rights: Some Thoughts for an Effective Next Step in
InternationalLaw, Business and Human Rights, 1 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. & Bus. 18 (2016);
Olivier de Schutter, Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights, 1 BUS.
HUM. RTS. J. 41 (2015).
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rarely. Yet, enforcement of any rule of public international law is
149
This is particularly true with regard to
inherently problematic.
human rights enforcement, which is notoriously weak at the
international level. The concrete design of a treaty is unclear, as the
recent initiative is deliberately vague and the new working group's work
has just begun. Broadly speaking, the treaty would most likely focus on
specialized state obligations to prevent and remedy corporate human
rights abuses, as well as on establishing businesses' own legal
obligations.

a. State Obligations
With regard to the primary role of states, the treaty would address
obligations-such as the obligation to enact specific legislation that
penalizes human rights abuses or to provide effective remedies for
victims-that, in their essence, already exist within general human
rights law. The firmly established triad of states' human rights
obligations contains the obligation to protect from human rights
violations by third parties, including private businesses. The value of a
treaty would thus not be the creation of entirely new obligations and
standards. Indeed, a separate treaty might insofar even have the
adverse effect of providing states not party to the agreement the basis
for arguing that they, in reverse, do not have such obligations under
general human rights law.150
The real value is insofar to be sought rather in the further
clarification of state obligations in a legally binding manner. The UN
51
could serve as inspiration, for it requires
Anti-Corruption Convention
52
Still, the treaty
states to enact specific laws to combat corruption.1
would need to be broadly phrased to cover all relevant constellations,

BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT?, 162 (Surya Deva

&

149. The lack of central enforcement mechanisms, among others, has prompted some to
deny public international law the character of law altogether. But see JENS DAVID OHLIN,
THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAw (2015) (providing an alternate vision of
international law based on an innovative theory of human rationality).
150. Cf. Ruggie, supra note 34 (arguing the "protect, respect and remedy" framework
offers a platform for generating cumulative and sustainable progress without foreclosing
further developments in international law).
151. UN Convention Against Corruption, entry into force Dec. 14, 2005, 2349 U.N.T.S.
41.
152. Anita Ramasastry, Closing the Governance Gap in the Business and Human Rights
Arena: Lessons from the Anti-Corruption Movement, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF
David Bilchitz eds., 2013); John Ruggie, Recommendations on Follow-up to the Mandate 5
(Feb. 11, 2011), available at http//business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documentsr
uggie/ruggie-special-mandate-follow-up-11-feb-2011.pdf
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which makes it seem likely that it would not exceed the level of detail
provided by the GPs and their commentaries. Further clarification
would thus depend on the interpretation of the treaty-a process,
however, that could be based on existing human rights treaties more
easily and without much opposition. If states were to continuously
support the guidance offered by the GPs together with a stronger
dedication of the UN treaty bodies, the GPs could even amount to
subsequent practice in the interpretation of existing human rights
instruments.1 53
The benefit of a binding instrument fades even more when
addressing its potential enforcement vis-a-vis state parties. Studies
have suggested that human rights treaties alone do not make much of a
difference.1 54 Instead, membership can be used as an excuse to
"substitute words (in the form of ratification) for deeds, thereby slowing,
rather than hastening, improvements in human rights."15 5 It would thus
be crucial to establish a strong monitoring and enforcement
mechanism, 5 6 at least similar to the UN treaty bodies. The work of
these bodies and the enforcement and monitoring of universal human
rights treaties depend on the cooperation of the state parties.1 57 The
already existing Working Group on the GPs, however, could also do the
same work, for that Working Group is equally based on voluntary
cooperation and public pressure. If the Working Group's position were
strengthened, the need for a standalone treaty with a separate treaty
body would no longer be apparent, at least given the costs any
hypothetical treaty is most likely to carry with it.
b. Direct Human Rights Obligationsof Businesses
A treaty, even assuming that states were willing to participate, is
thus not an automatic guarantee for increased state regulatory activity
on the issue of business and human rights. Yet, while the states'
obligations under human rights law are principally accepted and the
value of a hypothetical treaty seems insofar rather small, the same is
153. See VCLT, supra note 64, art. 31. See also International Law Commission, Treaties
over Time / Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Interpretation
of Treaties, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_11.shtml (last updated Sept. 28 2016).
154. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 2020 (2002).
155. Oona A. Hathaway, Making Human Rights Treaties Work: Global Legal
Information & Human Rights in the 21st Centur, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 312, 315 (2003).
156. See Yvonne M. Dutton, Commitment to InternationalHuman Rights Treaties: The
Role of Enforcement Mechanisms, 34 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 55 (2012); Hathaway, supra note
154, at 2023.
157. Hathaway, supra note 154, at 2023.
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not true with regard to corporate obligations. Instead, imposing direct
international legal human rights obligations on private business
enterprises would be something entirely new. Some may have warned
58
against broadening subjectivity under international law,1 but doctrinal
concerns do not suggest the impossibility of a wide entrance of legal
persons as obligor in the arena of international human rights law.
A more compelling reservation against a treaty that creates
corporate obligations might be the risk of diffusing rather than
clarifying responsibilities by distracting from the primary role of
states.159 Indeed, some argue that holding corporations liable under
international law would generally mean to put them at the center of
international law-a position that belonged to states (and potentially
the people). 60 This diffusion could eventually harm victims rather than
help them,' 6 ' as it might create a situation in which no one-neither
states nor businesses-assumes any responsibility by passing it to the
other. It would thus be important to create a framework that combines
and conciliates states' obligations with businesses' obligations.
Merely establishing such obligations in treaty-form will not suffice
to provide an effective protection regime. Enforcing corporate human
rights obligations is the crux of the matter. Given that businesses would
not only be actors of the international legal order, but that they would
also remain subjects to the jurisdiction of the state in which they
operate, enforcement is possible on the international as well as the
national level.
The primary role in enforcing corporate obligations would lie in the
domestic legal sphere. International remedies are usually subsidiary, as
evidenced, for example, by the complementarity principle of the ICC or
the conditioning of individual international claims on the prior
exhaustion of effective domestic remedies. It would be upon the organs
of each state to establish and enforce rules to prevent, punish, and
remedy corporate human rights abuses. This could include creating the
possibility of individual redress claims based on corporations' direct
international obligations. Enforcing businesses' obligations thus directly
158. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects"of InternationalLaw?, 9 SANTA
(2011); Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and
Developing Public InternationalLaw, 32 DUKE L.J. 748 (1983); John H. Knox, Horizontal
Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008); Townley, supranote 121.
159. See International Chamber of Commerce, supra note 145. But see Lee McConell,
Assessing the Feasibility of a Business and Human Rights Treaty, 66 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
143.
160. See Carrillo-Santarelli & Cerni6, supra note 134, at 4 (describing Tara von Ho's
approach based on State obligations to undertake regulation and prevent and respond to
abuses).
161. Id.
CLARA J. INT'L L. 1
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correlates with the states' own obligation to protect. This begs the
question why we should base corporate accountability on international
human rights obligations instead of national tort, criminal, contract, or
other laws, as suggested in some of the other contributions in this issue.
While the former might create unforeseen uncertainties by
departing from human rights' state-centrism, the latter risks
perpetuating the existing inequality with regard to domestic legal
regulations. The latter reservation, however, loses its persuasiveness if
a theoretical treaty were to require states to harmonize their legal
orders. The need for direct international human rights obligations of
businesses thus seems, at least with regard to their national
enforcement, not absolutely necessary.
In contrast, international legal obligations of corporations would
truly become essential when dealing with their own international
accountability. The strongest way to enforce such obligations
internationally would be through an international court. More
realistically, a treaty body could hear complaints by individuals,
nongovernmental organizations, and states. 162 This way of enforcement
would be of a secondary nature, but in cases where the primary level at
the domestic level fails, international accountability could fill the gap in
the protection against corporate human rights abuses. It is here that a
treaty on the issue would unfold its true value.
The question, however, remains whether the good a treaty
potentially provides is worth the high costs that are most likely to be
accompanied by it. We argue that it currently does not.
CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD
The field of business and human rights is shaped by an imbalance
between power and responsibility. While private corporations have the
potential to affect human rights adversely, the state-centered
international legal system is as of yet unable to effectively fill the gaps
in the protection against third-party human rights abuses.
The most obvious and powerful objection against proposals for
change is the lack of consensus. States could so far only agree on the
SRSG's Framework and GPs-"soft law" instruments whose legal
strength and implementation are, as of yet, too weak. Of course, missing
support by states must not become a knockout argument to any legal
reform. Missing political will must instead be countered with
widespread pressure by civil society. Other points raised in this Article
have demonstrated, however, that any pursuit of changing existing legal
162. See also Ratner, supra note 6, at 539-40.
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instruments or of creating new ones must be crafted carefully under full
consideration of their ramifications.
The new initiative within the UNHRC seems to do quite the
opposite with its reference to overcome ideologies and one-sided views.
A symbolic treaty with few state parties will not bring an effective
protection regime; instead, such a treaty will damage the steps already
taken, achieving the exact opposite of what is intended, namely, the
worsening of the situation of victims of corporate human rights abuses
rather than improving it.
That is not to say that a treaty is per se a bad idea. However, a
specialized treaty on business and human rights would hardly be the
"silver bullet" to the human rights and business conundrum. Even if a
treaty existed, the process of enforcement would not end there. Yet, that
very process already exists within the young Framework and GPs. A
new treaty would mean to start anew, despite all assurances to the
contrary. With many states and the corporate world in opposition, the
treaty would jeopardize rather than promote the mutual trust-building
process the GPs have started. It is thus crucial to take the issue one
step at a time instead of taking too many steps at once, stumbling, and
potentially tearing the whole process down.
What, then, could the next steps be? We propose to progress
simultaneously on the international as well as the national level.
Internationally, the GPs need to be strengthened, flanked with an
16 3
The
overarching effort by all stakeholders, including civil society.
with
expanded
further
Working Group's position should be
wholehearted support by states and civil organizations. Its mandate
makes it possible to fulfil the task of monitoring implementation,
including by businesses-preferably in close cooperation with existing
monitoring initiatives 6 4 -and gives clear guidance on how to proceed
with this endeavor.
Domestically, states will need to develop "National Action Plans" for
the implementation of the GPs into their legal systems. 165 Here, further

163. See Aaronson & Higham, supra note 23, at 337; Stiphanie Lagoutte, New
Challenges Facing States within the Field of Human Rights and Business, 33 NORDIc J.
HUM. RTS. 158, 179 (2015).
164. See Backer, supra note 129, at 497-517; Damiano de Felice, Business and Human
Rights Indicators to Measure the Corporate Responsibility to Respect: Challenges and
Opportunities37 HUM. RTS. Q. 511, 513-15 (2015), for more on such projects.
165. UN Human Rights Council, supra note 8, at 11 94-95; Backer, supra note 129, at
472-91; Lagoutte, supra note 163, at 180. On the benefits of coordinating and peerreviewing these National Action Plans in the European Union, see Daniel Augenstein,
Mark Dawson & Pierre Thielborger, Implementing the UNGPs in the European Union:
Towards an Open Method of Coordination for Business and Human Rights (European
University Institute, Department of Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2017), http1/cadmus.euieu/
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commitment and pressure is needed, as an instrument created in
Geneva or New York can only help victims of human rights abuses if it
arrives in Berlin, Paris, London, Tokyo, and Washington. Today, it is
uncertain how far enforcement through national legal systems in fact
goes. For example, foremost the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.166 has left observers with little hope that
the U.S. court system will (again) seize the opportunity to address
extraterritorial human rights abuses of corporations. 6 7 Other recent
judgments, notably in the Netherlands,168 however, have given reason
for a more positive outlook. Equally inconsistent, some states have
created criminal liability of corporations for international crimes, while
others have not. The process of implementing the GPs and harmonizing
standards is thus dearly needed. States must learn from each other's
experiences in this regard so that "good practices" for action plans can
be identified and shared. This process has just started and will take
much effort to be concluded. It must not be jeopardized by calls for
premature new instruments. Instead, these calls and public pressure
altogether have to shift their focus from the international to the
national legal sphere.
As far as corporations are concerned, an omnipresence of their
responsibility to respect human rights must be established. It must
become clear that their responsibility is not merely an issue of voluntary
self-regulation, but a quasi-normative expectation. Harold Hongju Koh
explained why legal norms are generally enforced with his idea of a
"transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization."169 He argues that every stakeholder has to "encourage
people to bring rules home, to internalize these rules inside themselves,
to transform themselves from lawless into law-abiding individuals."17 0
Corporate decision-makers, shareholders, and the like must equally
internalize the "soft" GPs in order to "harden" them eventually. 171

handle/1814/44854.
166. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
167. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 835 (2013).
168. See Anthony Deutsch, Dutch Appeals Court Says Shell May Be Held Liable for Oil
Spills in Nigeria, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2015), http//www.theguardian.com/global-development/2
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Verschuuren, The Future of Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Human Rights
Abuses: The Dutch Case Against Shell, Am. J. Int'l L. Unbound e-36 (Jan. 2014).
169. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
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Where companies commit themselves to CSR codes, this can also be
understood as an expression of accepting the GPs, which, in turn, may
lead to liability under domestic (civil) law. Ultimately, the GPs as an
international framework would then directly inform private law, in
particular contract and tort law. In this way, enforcing CSR codes and
enforcing human rights standards domestically go hand in hand and
are, in that way, two sides of the same coin. In fact, the enforcement of
CSR codes could be seen as a crucial element in the effective
implementation of both the first and second pillars of the GPs. Relying
on corporate codes would be a first step of companies to fulfill their
responsibility to respect. On the other hand, domestically enforcing
these codes in accordance with states' international human rights
obligations can be seen as one aspect through which states meet their
duty to protect.
These steps will take time, but so would a costly treaty-making
process. International attention should not focus on a top-down
approach, that is, on creating a new treaty and hoping for change
coming out of it. Instead, states should be pushed to alter their domestic
legal systems directly by implementing the GPs. It is now not the time
172
This is where
for new norm creation, but for implementation.
international efforts are currently best invested. That way, state
practice could emerge and eventually lead to a consensus that treaties,
either singularly or globally, are necessary. In the long run, treatymaking, not (mis)guided by bias against the GPs, but instead construed
as a further step in the process that has been started by them, will be a
73
promising course of action.1 The time for this further step, however, is
not yet here.
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